The second sentence of the rule draws attention to the limits of the rule. Exclusion is only required if evidence of subsequent corrective action is presented as evidence of negligence or culpable conduct. It rejects the proposed conclusion that an error is admitted. However, other purposes are permitted, including ownership or control, the existence of duties and the feasibility of precautionary measures, in the event of litigation, and removal. 2 Wigmore § 283; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296. Two recent federal cases are an example. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961), a lawsuit brought against an aircraft manufacturer for using an allegedly defective alternator shaft that caused an aircraft accident, confirmed the admissibility of evidence of subsequent design modifications to show that design changes and safety precautions were feasible.

and Powers v. J. B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964), an action brought against a road contractor for negligent failure to post warning signs, led the defendant to subsequently install signs indicating that the section of road in question was under his control. The requirement that the other subject matter be challenged requires automatic exclusion unless there is a real problem and allows the opposing party to create the basis for the exclusion by an admission. Otherwise, the factors of undue disadvantage, confusion of issues, deception of the jury and loss of time must still be examined in accordance with Rule 403 of the Rules. 1 White Construction Co. v. DuPont, 455 So. 2D 1026 (fla. 1984); City of Miami Beach v.

Wolfe, 83 So. 2d 774 (fla. 1955); Reinhart v. Seaboard Coast Line, 422 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982). 2 Harris gegen Florida Power & Light Co., 22 Fla. L.

Weekly D2416 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 15. octobre 1997); Stadt Niceville c. Hardy, 160 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1964). 3 Ellis gegen Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.

1st D.C.A. 1977). 4 Murray v. Almaden Vineyards, 429 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983). 5 Del Monte Banana Corp. gegen Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167, 1173 n.5 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1985). 6 Sikes v.

Seaboard Coast Line Railway Co., 429 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983). 7 In re Aircrash in Bali, 871 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1989); Chase gegen General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988). 8 Danahue gegen Albertson’s Inc., 472 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985). Siehe allgemein Alderman v.

Wysong & Miles Co., 486 So. 2d 673, 678 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986). 9 Prentiss & Carlisle Co. gegen Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1. Cir. 1992); Dow Chemical Corp. gegen Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 8487-88 (10th Cir. 1990). 10 Siehe Johns-Manville Sales Corp.

c. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 256 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984). 11 Voir de manière générale Johnson v. Treasure Coast Plaza, 670 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.

4th D.C.A. 1996). 12 Previous doubts as to the applicability of the rule in no-fault product liability actions have been dispelled in favour of the application of the rule. Alderman v. Wysong & Miles Co., 486 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986); Voynar v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 463 So.

2D 409, 412-413 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984). See also Wood v. Morbark Industries, 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995). 13 Keller Industries v. Volk, 657 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1995); Brantley v Snapper Power Equipment, 665 So. 2d 241 (Fla.3d D.C.A.

1995). See also Department of Transportation v. Webb, 409 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982), amended, 438 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1983); Sikes v.

Seaboard Coast Line Railway Co., 429 So. 2d to 1219. 14 The new version of Fed. R. Evid. Article 407 states: “If, as a result of injury or damage allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken which, had they been taken previously, would have made the occurrence of the event less likely, proof of subsequent actions is not admissible to require negligence, wrongful conduct, defect in a product, defect in the design of a product, or the need for a warning or instruction. Prove. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent actions when they are offered for other purposes, such as proof of ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary measures, in the event of litigation, or dismissal. 15 Communication from the Committee to Fed. R. Evid. 407.

16 American Motors v Ellis, 403 So. 2D 459, 465-66 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981). 17 Duggan v Board of County Commissioners, 747 P.2d 6 (Colo. ct. App. 1987).

18 Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d to 256. 19 American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 465-66 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981). 20 Thursby v Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245, 248 & n.6 (Fla.

1st D.C.A. 1984). The Fourth District, after noting that the Florida legislature passed Fed. R. Evid`s last sentence. 407 noted that “the Florida courts have grafted this part of the federal rule into Florida law.” Keller Industries v. Volk, 657 So. 2d c. 1203.

However, the Court did not discuss the requirement “if challenged” and, in all the cases cited, the provision on the admissibility of subsequent remedies “available for other purposes” was considered. 21 Murray v Almaden Vineyards, 429 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983). 22 Hethcoat v Chevron Oil Corp., 383 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980). 23 Morowitz v.

Vistaview Apartments, 613 So. 2d 493 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1993); Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Corp., 383 So. 2d 931. See also Carnival Cruise Line v. Rosania, 546 So. 2d 736 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1989) (Schwartz, C.J., partially different) (if the defendant alleges that the obstruction on the ship was so obvious that he tripped over it negligently, he should be able to provide evidence that he placed a chair at the accident site after the accident, to warn other passengers of the existence of the defect). 24 See, for example, Gardner v Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 675 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1982). 25 Wood v.

Morbark Industries, 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995); Wilkinson v Carnival Cruise Lines, 920 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1992). Duke Accord v. Lexington Township, 657 N.E.2d 926, 933 (ill. 1995).

For the purposes of section 90.403 of Fla. Stat., see Watson v. Builders Square, 563 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1990); Voynar v Butler Manufacturing Co., 463 So. 2d 409, 412 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984). 26 See, for example, Espeaignnette v Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994); TLT-Babcock, Inc. v.

Emerson Electric Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1994); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991); Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1991). 27 TLT-Babcock, Inc. v.

Emerson Electric Co., 33 F.3d at 400. Rule 407 provides that evidence of subsequent remedies in the event of removal and for any other purpose, such as proof of ownership, control or feasibility, is admissible only if the other objective is “contested”. Section 90.407 does not contain a similar provision; The authors apparently considered the deletion of the express provision to be completely superfluous. However, a Florida decision appears to have ruled that evidence of subsequent remedies is admissible to prove an issue such as control, ownership, or feasibility, even if the issue is not disputed.19 Another court, citing the federal agency and without the difference between Florida and federal regulations, concluded that evidence of subsequent remedies is inadmissible if the issue is not challenged.20 Subsequent remedies are usually presented as evidence as indictments. In one case where the plaintiff was injured by a cork stopper that was ejected spontaneously, the respondent`s employee testified that a natural wood cork would not be ejected unless the bottle was handled improperly.21 The second LOAC concluded that, in these circumstances, the applicant was entitled to dismiss the witness by introducing retrospective compensation – a warning label after an accident, which the defendant affixed to bottles. Indication that the cylinder is pressurized and the cap is ejected shortly after removal of the metal hood. Another question that has arisen is whether an ex post appeal by a third State can be introduced as evidence. From the early to mid-1980s, the first LOAC struggled with whether section 90.407 prevented non-participants from taking retrospective corrective action.